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Abstract: Using a sample of European commercial banks over the period 1993-2006, we 
show that market discipline significantly and positively affects banks' capital buffer. By 
distinguishing junior from senior debt holders, we find that both types of investors exert a 
pressure on banks to hold more capital but that the pressure exerted by junior debt holders is 
higher. Furthermore, junior debt holders exert a pressure on banks whatever the importance of 
their non-traditional activities. By contrast, we find that senior debt holders exert a pressure 
only on banks that are heavily involved in non-traditional activities that are badly taken into 
account in the current bank capital regulation framework. These results might help us to better 
understand the role of market discipline as a complement to capital regulation.  
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2 
1. Introduction 
 
After the implementation of Basel I, there has been a noticeable upward trend in bank 
capital ratios throughout G-10 countries with banks holding capital ratios well beyond the 
minimum regulatory constraint. This has raised the question of why banks hold such high 
regulatory capital ratios, or put differently, why they hold capital in excess
1
 of what is 
required by the regulator. Indeed, bankers often argue that capital is more expensive than 
debt. Therefore, several studies aim to determine what underlines this unexpected behavior by 
studying the determinants of capital buffer. In this vein, Lindquist (2004) considers 
Norwegian banks and investigates if risk is an important determinant of the buffer
2
. He does 
not find any significant link. Ayuso et al. (2004), Stolz and Wedow (2009) consider Spanish 
and German banks respectively and Jokipii and Milne (2008) consider banks from 25 
European countries to investigate how the business cycle influences the buffer. Their results 
globally indicate that banks tend to decrease the buffer during the upturn and increase it in the 
downturn.  
In our analysis, we mainly focus on the role played by market discipline. Using a 
sample of European commercial banks on 1993-2006
3
, we study the influence
4
 of market 
discipline on the build-up of capital buffer. According to Evanoff and Wall (2000), banks can 
be exposed to ex-ante or ex-post market discipline. Ex-post market discipline implies that 
banks change their behaviour following a change in debt spread whereas ex-ante market 
discipline refers to the fact that banks exposed to market discipline may change their 
behaviour ex-ante in order to avoid the costs imposed by market participants through higher 
spreads. In this paper, we consider ex-ante discipline assuming that this discipline encourages 
banks to behave more prudently. Other papers have considered market discipline. For 
example, Flannery and Rangan (2008) using large US banks, investigate the causes of the 
bank capital build-up of the 1990s. They find that even though several factors explain the 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this paper, this excess capital is called capital buffer and defined as the difference between the 
actual capital ratio ((Tier1+Tier2)/Risk weighted assets) and the Basel minimum required capital ratio (8%), 
except for special cases (see 2.2). 
2
 A study by Jokippi and Milne (2010) focuses on the relationship between risk and the buffer adjustments and 
finds a positive two-way link. 
3
 Our sample period ends in 2006 to avoid that the anticipation of Basel II implementation and the subprime 
crisis affect our analysis. 
4
 Bliss and Flannery (2001) distinguish two components of market discipline: monitoring that corresponds to the 
fact that investors accurately assess changes in banks financial condition and promptly incorporate it into their 
stock and bond prices, and  influence that is the ability of market participants to affect banks’ financial decisions. 
In this paper, we focus on influence.  
  
 
3 
capital build-up, market discipline
5
 contributed to the largest part of it. Fonseca and Gonzalez 
(2010), using a cross country data based on 70 countries, aim to determine if the influence of 
market discipline
6
 (among other factors) on capital buffer varies between countries that have 
different frameworks of regulation, supervision and institutions. They show that, although the 
market discipline indicator has a positive impact on the bank capital buffer, the relationship 
depends on some structural factors. Restrictions on bank activities, official supervision and 
bad institutional environment reduce the incentives to hold capital buffers by weakening 
market discipline. The closest paper to ours is Nier and Baumann (2006). They test 
empirically the hypothesis that market discipline provides incentives for banks to constitute 
capital buffer in order to limit their default risk. They find, using a large cross-country panel 
data set from 32 countries, that market discipline, measured as the share of interbank deposits 
and subordinated debt in total liabilities, induces banks to choose higher capital ratios.  
We contribute to the previous literature on two main aspects. First, we distinguish 
junior from senior debt holders. Indeed, both types of debt holders are not expected to 
similarly consider bankruptcy risk because their status in case of liquidation is different. 
Junior debt holders have a lower priority than senior debt holders and thus are more at risk. 
Thus, we test whether these two kinds of debt holders exert a significant pressure on banks to 
hold capital buffer and whether junior debt holders exert a higher pressure. It is important to 
determine whether the discipline exerted by these different debt holders might be considered 
as a complement to capital regulation and which one is the most effective. Second, we suspect 
that market participants may require capital buffer because the regulatory capital constraint 
does not appropriately take into account all the risks borne by banks specifically those related 
to non-traditional activities (in opposition to traditional activities such as loan supply). Indeed, 
it is widely known that the substantial growth of the off-balance sheet activities experienced 
during the last years was mainly motivated by the low capital regulatory requirements 
associated with them (Jagtiani et al. (1995)). Moreover, it is also recognized that the trading 
book was a key source of the build-up of the leverage witnessed during the last financial 
crisis. As argued in a recent BIS document (BCBS (2009b)), “an important contributing factor 
was that the current capital framework for market risk, based on the 1996 Amendment to the 
Capital Accord to incorporate market risks, does not capture some key risks”. Accordingly, 
                                                 
5
 Flannery and Rangan (2008) consider bank's quasi-market value of assets volatility as the risk variable and 
assume that bank counterparties require higher capital buffers accordingly. Thus, if BHCs are subject to market 
forces the coefficient associated with the risk variable should be significant and the more market discipline there 
is the higher should be the coefficient.   
6
 Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) consider countries with very different banking systems and therefore, they are 
able to use the cost of deposits as a market discipline proxy. 
  
 
4 
the activities of banks have rapidly and deeply changed these last decades: market activities 
have expanded with the creation of more and more complex financial instruments and banks 
have broadly used securitization. These changes have been reflected in the structure of banks’ 
income with an increasing proportion of non-interest income
7
. By contrast, capital regulation 
seems quite rigid; it is difficult to adapt it quickly and adequately to this highly evolving 
environment. We assume that market participants may adapt more rapidly and may consider 
these changes to determine the adequate level of capital of the bank. Thus, it appears 
interesting to determine whether the impact of market discipline on bank capital buffer is 
different depending on whether the bank is highly involved in non-traditional activities or not. 
If market discipline is effective for banks highly involved in non-traditional activities, it might 
be used as a complement to capital regulation.    
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we set our hypotheses and 
the method used to test them, define our variables and present the sample of banks. The 
results and the robustness checks are presented in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Hypotheses, model, variables and sample 
 
2.1. Hypotheses 
Firstly, we consider that banks whose debt holders are more sensitive to default risk 
are expected to hold more capital than prescribed by the regulator. Indeed, we assume that 
these debt holders may lack confidence in the ability of a bank to survive if it operates with a 
capital ratio very close to the regulatory minimum. In that case, they may pressure the bank to 
hold more capital than required by regulation. Hence, we consider that the type of funding 
could impact bank capital buffer. Accordingly, we investigate the impact of market discipline 
on capital buffer by focusing on the extent to which banks rely on market funding. Capital 
buffer should be positively related to the proportion of market funding. Indeed, their holders 
are the creditors who have the highest incentives to exert a discipline and thus it is more 
costly for banks to increase their risk of default when they have a larger proportion of market 
liabilities (Nier and Baumann (2006)). Besides, it has been shown both theoretically and 
empirically by Gropp and Vesala (2004) that banks with a larger share of uninsured funding 
                                                 
7
 Non-interest income includes trading income beyond commission and fee income. 
  
 
5 
have incentives to take less risk. They suggest that the larger is the proportion of uninsured 
funding, the stronger is the effect of market discipline. Indeed, the larger is the proportion of 
uninsured liabilities, the stronger is the cost impact related to market discipline for a given 
increase in bank risk
8
. Thus, following these studies, we consider that the structure of bank 
liabilities is a crucial factor and assume that banks heavily relying on market funding may 
exhibit higher capital buffer as they are potentially more subject to market discipline.
 9
        
 
H1: Market debt holders exert a pressure on banks to hold capital buffer: the more the bank 
relies on market funding the higher is its capital buffer. 
 
Secondly, there is a variety of uninsured debt holders of banks and they may behave 
differently. A large part of the literature on market discipline is dedicated to subordinated debt 
(Bliss (2001), Evanoff and Wall (2000), Morgan and Stiroh (2001), Sironi (2003)). The 
reason is that for market discipline to be effective, market participants must have the 
incentives to exert it, that is they must feel at risk, and subordinated debt holders are 
particularly at risk due to their junior status. Indeed, junior debt also named subordinated debt 
corresponds to a debt that has a lower priority than other debt in case of failure of the issuer. It 
comes after government tax authorities and senior debt holders in the hierarchy of creditors 
and just before equity. Thus, subordinated debt holders are particularly at risk and have higher 
incentives to monitor banks and to exert a discipline. Therefore, we distinguish junior from 
senior debt holders and study whether both of them exert a pressure on banks to hold capital 
buffer. We expect that the pressure of the market on banks to hold capital buffer may be 
different depending on the status of the creditors: senior or junior debt holders. Junior debt 
holders should have more incentives to exert a pressure on banks.  
 
H2: The market pressure exerted by junior debt holders on banks to hold capital buffer is 
higher than the one exerted by senior debt holders. 
 
                                                 
8
 This assumes that the conditions of effectiveness of market discipline are fulfilled. These conditions are: i) debt 
holders consider themselves at risk if the bank defaults, ii) they have sufficient information to assess bank risk 
and, iii) changes in the bank’s risk profile have cost implications for the bank (Nier and Baumann (2006)). 
9
 We do not consider a price measure such as bond spread. Indeed, this would refer to ex-post market discipline 
and would assume that a higher spread leads a bank to increase its buffer in order to reduce its cost of funding. In 
this paper, we focus on ex-ante discipline and assume that banks exposed to market discipline change their 
behaviour ex-ante in order to avoid the costs imposed by market participants through higher spreads. 
  
 
6 
Lastly, we depart from the fact that trading activities and securitizations have gained 
an increasing importance in recent years but that they are more imperfectly taken into account 
in the current Basel accords than bank traditional activities (BCBS (2009a), BCBS (2009b)). 
We therefore conjecture that, the more the bank is involved in trading activities, the more 
capital buffer market participants require. Indeed, we assume that the market, contrary to 
regulators, can adapt quickly (De Young et al. (2001)) and consider the risk of these activities 
which are not well taken into account in the regulatory constraint. We hypothesize that the 
type of activity of banks affects capital buffer. The market pressure on banks heavily involved 
in non-traditional activities (market activities as opposed to loan activity)
10
 to hold capital 
buffer may be higher than on those more turned towards traditional activities as it reflects the 
imperfection of the current regulation.   
 
H3: The market pressure on banks to hold capital buffer is higher for those more involved in 
trading activities. 
 
 
2.2. Model and main variables 
To test our three hypotheses, we estimate the two following models. Subscripts i  and 
t  denote bank and period respectively.  
, 0 1 , , ,
1
                                           
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

           (1) 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
_ _           
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc senior mktdisc junior C u     

         (2) 
Buffer is the regulatory capital buffer variable, mktdisc, mktdisc_senior, and 
mktdisc_junior the market discipline variables, Cj the j
th
 control variable and i and t  the 
individual and time fixed effects
11
. 
The dependent variable buffer corresponds to the amount of capital banks hold in 
excess of what is required by national regulators. More precisely, we construct the variable 
buffer as the bank’s actual total risk-weighted capital ratio less its regulatory minimum 
                                                 
10
 Non-traditional activities not only consist of market activities. For example, there are also insurance activities 
and other financial services. However, in this paper, we focus on activities generating market risks as they are 
considered to be imperfectly taken into account in the current Basel accords.  
11
 The regressions include individual and time fixed effects as the Fisher test rejects the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity in both individual and time dimensions.  
  
 
7 
requirement. This regulatory minimum requirement is set to 8% in most countries of our 
sample except in Germany where it is set to 12.5% for newly established banks in the first 
two years of business and in the United Kingdom where we consider 9%. Indeed, the 
Financial Stability Authority (FSA) sets two separate capital requirements for each UK bank: 
a ‘trigger ratio’, which is the minimum individual capital ratio; and a ‘target ratio’ set above 
the trigger. We therefore follow Jokipii and Milne (2008) and consider 9% minimum capital 
requirement ratio for all UK banks. 
Hypothesis H1 is tested by estimating Model 1 and testing the significance of the 
coefficient associated with our market discipline indicator mktdisc. We expect to find a 
positive and significant relationship with capital buffer. The market discipline indicator 
reflects the importance of market funded liabilities in total liabilities. This ratio is constructed 
as (total liabilities minus total deposits)/ total liabilities.  
In order to test our second hypothesis H2, we estimate Model 2 in which we replace 
the previous market discipline indicator by two separate indicators: one for senior debt 
(mktdisc_senior) and one for junior debt (mktdisc_junior). Our variable mktdisc_junior 
corresponds to the ratio of subordinated debt to total liabilities
12
. The ratio of senior market 
debt mktdisc_senior is constructed as (total liabilities minus total deposits
13
 minus 
subordinated debt)/ total liabilities
14
. This ratio considers only senior market debt that is 
market debt that takes priority over junior debt. In case of bank default, senior debt holders 
are reimbursed before junior debt holders. We expect to find higher significance level and/or 
higher coefficient magnitude for the variable mktdisc_junior than for the variable 
mktdisc_senior. 
 
To test the third hypothesis H3 that is whether the pressure exerted by market 
participants on banks to hold capital buffer is different depending on bank activities, we 
estimate Models 1 and 2 on different sub-samples defined on the basis of two alternative 
                                                 
12 Tier 2 contains subordinated debt that consists only in “conventional unsecured subordinated debt capital 
instruments with a minimum original fixed term to maturity of over five years and limited life redeemable 
preference shares” and that is limited to 50% of Tier 1 (BCBS, 1988). However, this does not imply a 
straightforward positive relationship between our independent variable of interest mktdisc_junior and buffer. 
Indeed, our dependent variable is not Tier 2 but capital buffer. Even if a bank issues subordinated debt to 
increase its Tier 2, it does not necessarily imply that it holds a higher capital buffer. For example, the bank can 
substitute Tier 2 to Tier 1. Besides, to check that our results are not mechanically driven by the potential 
inclusion of some subordinated debt into Tier 2 capital,we have run regressions considering only subordinated 
debt which cannot be potentially eligible for Tier 2. Our conclusions remain unchanged (see section 3.2.).  
13
 Our variable mktdisc_senior does not contain interbank deposits as they are included in total deposits. 
14
 We also consider as a robustness check a narrower definition of senior debt focusing on money market 
funding. This leads to the same conclusions (see section 3.2.). 
  
 
8 
ratios. First, we consider the revenue generated by trading activities and construct the ratio of 
net trading revenue to net operating income where net operating income is defined as net 
interest income plus net non interest income
15
. We also consider the rough ratio of off-balance 
sheet activities to total assets as another proxy for the involvement of banks in non-traditional 
activities which generate market risk. The higher are these ratios, the higher is the 
involvement of banks in non-traditional activities. These ratios are used alternatively to 
separate our sample in two groups. For each ratio, we separate banks with a value of the 
considered ratio higher than the median from those with a ratio lower than the median
16
. Our 
hypothesis is that our market discipline variables may be more significant or only significant 
for banks more involved in non-traditional activities.  
 
In all our regressions, in line with the existing literature, we consider several control 
variables Cj likely to explain banks' capital buffer.  
Following Flannery and Rangan (2008), we consider the fact that capital buffer could 
simply reflect an unusual period of bank profitability. When raising new capital is costly, 
capital accumulation could rely on internally generated funds, in line with the “Pecking order 
theory” of capital structure. Bankers may increase capitalization through higher retained 
earnings and weaker dividend payments and stock repurchase. We therefore expect a positive 
relationship between profit, which is defined as post tax profit/ total assets, and capital buffer.  
In a world different from that of Modigliani and Miller (1958), equity is more costly 
compared to other bank liabilities because of information asymmetries. Equity may also be 
disadvantaged because interest payments on debt are deducted from earnings before tax.  
Capital buffer is hence expected to be negatively associated with the cost of equity. However, 
direct measurement of this cost is difficult. Therefore, previous studies have considered the 
return on equity (ROE) as a proxy variable for the direct cost of capital buffer
17
.  
We consider the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans (llpnl) as the risk variable 
and the expected sign between this variable and capital buffer is not clear cut. Indeed, on the 
                                                 
15
 Net non interest income is defined as the sum of net commission and fee income and net trading revenue. 
16
 Note that 63% of the observations are classified similarly on the basis of these two different criteria. As a 
robustness check, we also consider another criterion than the median. In order to have sub-samples of banks with 
very different characteristics in terms of activity, we consider the median value of the considered ratio and delete 
the 10% of our sample observations with a value of the ratio around the median. Then, we separate banks with 
low values from banks with high values. Using this criterion leads to similar conclusions (see section 3.2.). 
17
 As stressed by Jokipii and Milne (2008), ROE reflects both cost and revenue and is strongly correlated with 
the profit variable (in our sample, the coefficient of correlation between ROE and profit is of 77.4%). As the cost 
of equity may be an important determinant of capital buffer, we deal with the issue of correlation by 
orthogonalizing the variable ROE with our profit variable. The variable roe used in our regressions corresponds 
to the orthogonalized variable. Thus, we make sure that we do not omit an important determinant. 
  
 
9 
one hand a strand of literature outlines a significant positive impact of risk on capital 
(Flannery and Rangan (2008), Gropp and Heider (2010) and Berger et al. (2008)). The 
rationale for this finding is that good bank management implies that the more the risk the 
bank plans to take, the more the capital it keeps aside. On the other hand, there is another 
strand of literature that supports the idea that the increase of ex-post measure of risk should 
lower capital buffer given that capital is kept to face unexpected losses (Ayuso et al. (2004), 
Nier and Baumann (2006) and Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010)). 
We also consider that banks which operate in a highly competitive environment are 
expected to hold more capital than prescribed by the regulator. The rationale for this 
behaviour might stem from the fact that capital buffer may serve as an instrument, which the 
bank is willing to pay for, in the competition with its peers for unsecured deposits and money 
market funding (Lindquist (2004), Dietrich and Vollmer (2005), Bernauer and Koubi (2006), 
and Schaeck and Cihak (2010)). Thus, we consider the annual mean of capital buffer of the 
bank’s competitors in the same country, comp, which should positively affect capital buffer.  
All else equal, an increase in assets through loans should increase capital requirements 
and therefore decrease capital buffer (Ayuso et al. (2004)). Thus, we expect a negative 
relationship between loang, the annual net loans growth rate, and the dependent variable. The 
importance of loans activity may also affect capital buffer. Indeed, we assume that loans 
activities are relatively better taken into account into the capital regulatory constraint than 
other non-traditional activities. Hence, we consider the variable nla, corresponding to the 
proportion of net loans in total assets, and expect a negative relationship between capital 
buffer and this variable.  
A consensus among the previous literature also emerges: it indicates that larger banks 
hold less average capital in excess of regulatory requirements due to scale economies in 
screening and monitoring and larger diversification. The dependent variable should be 
negatively related to size that is the natural logarithm of total assets. Another reason for large 
banks to hold a smaller buffer may be their Too Big To Fail (TBTF) nature. Indeed, if a bank 
is perceived as TBTF, this implies that it benefits from government implicit guarantee. 
Consequently, it could be less prudent in the building of its capital buffer.  
The level of capital banks hold may also depend on macroeconomic conditions. We 
therefore introduce the business cycle to determine whether it has any effect on the capital 
held by institutions. Previous studies have mostly shown that capital buffer and economic 
cycle tend to be negatively linked (Ayuso et al. (2004), Lindquist (2004), Jokipii and Milne 
(2008)). This is to say that banks tend to decrease their capital buffer during the upturn and 
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increase it in the downturn. The rationale for this finding may be found in Berger et al. (1995) 
who argue that banks may hold capital buffer to be able to exploit unexpected investment 
opportunities. Thus, we expect a negative link between the annual growth rate of the real 
Gross Domestic Product
18
, gdpg, and capital buffer.  
 
< Insert Table 1 > 
 
Table 1 summarizes our set of variables with some descriptive statistics on our sample 
of banks that we present in the following section
19
.  
 
2.3. Presentation of the sample 
Our sample consists of commercial banks
20
 established in 16 European countries
21
. 
The sample period is from 1993 to 2006
22
. Accounting data (annual financial statements) for 
individual banks are obtained from Bankscope Fitch IBCA. Bankscope reports balance sheets 
and income statements for 1985 commercial banks for the countries we consider in this study. 
Departing from these 1985 banks we end up with a sample of 742 banks. Indeed, the 
information about the total capital ratio
23
 is available only for 766 banks among which 24 
banks present outliers in the distribution of this ratio and were deleted. We verify that, on 
average, our sample of banks constitute over 56% of the banking assets of commercial banks 
of the respective sample countries in 2006
24
. We can notice that, except for four countries 
                                                 
18
 We also consider the output gap obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the real GDP series as an 
alternative indicator and get similar results. 
19
 We observe that our dependent variable buffer is on average equal to 4.72% which stands for the extra capital 
ratio that European commercial banks hold in excess of the regulatory minimum requirement. Nevertheless, our 
sample discloses a minimum of -6.48% which means that some banks do not comply with the regulatory 
constraint. We verify that only few observations correspond to a negative buffer (less than 3% of total 
observations) and that this does not affect our results. Therefore we keep them in our sample in order to avoid a 
selection bias. However, given that our investigation relates to capital buffer, we perform two robustness checks 
in which we exclude banks with negative capital buffer or banks whose capital ratio is close to the regulatory 
minimum (see section 3.2 for details). 
20
 To identify commercial banks, we consider the Bankscope Fitch IBCA’s classification. However, we notice 
that a bank classified as “commercial bank” can have a ratio (net loans/ total assets) equal to 0% or a ratio 
(market funding/ total liabilities) equal to 100%. Thus, to ensure that all the banks in our sample are commercial 
banks, i.e. they have loans and deposits activities, we clean our sample by deleting the observations of the ratios 
(net loans/ total assets) and (market funding/ total liabilities) that are respectively in the first and in the last 
percentile of their distribution. However, running our regressions with these observations does not affect our 
conclusions. 
21
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom (see table A1 in Appendix for details). 
22
 Notice that during the whole sample period banks are under the Basel I framework. 
23
 Total capital ratio is (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/ Risk weighted assets and is used to construct our dependent variable. 
24
 See table A1 in Appendix. 
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(Austria, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland), the final set of banks used in this study 
represents more than half of the banking system in terms of total assets of each country. Table 
2 gives some descriptive statistics on the starting sample and on our final sample. It allows us 
to verify that our final sample does not considerably differ from the starting sample. Indeed, 
we consider 10 key variables and disclose their mean and their standard deviation for the full 
sample available in Bankscope and the final sample that we use. Overall, we can see that the 
two samples are very close even though the banks in our sample seem to be, on average, 
larger in terms of total assets. 
 
< Insert Table 2 > 
 
 
3. Results and robustness checks 
 
3.1. Results 
In line with the previous literature (Ayuso et al. (2004), Jokipii and Milne (2008)), we 
suspect bank level variables to be endogenous, i.e. themselves dependent on capital buffer
25
. 
Following Nier and Baumann (2006), we therefore consider the TSLS procedure with 
estimators of variance-covariance matrix that are robust to heteroskedasticity. Our set of 
instruments consists of the one year lagged values of these variables.  
 
< Insert Table 3 > 
 
First, we estimate a model with our control variables and the market discipline 
variable mktdisc (model 1) on the full sample of banks. The results are presented in Table 3 
column (1). The coefficient associated with the variable mktdisc is significant at the one 
percent level with the positive expected sign. Thus, market participants exert a pressure on 
banks to hold capital buffer. This result is in line with previous studies (Nier and Baumann 
(2006), Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010)) which find, with 
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 Indeed, a reverse relationship with capital buffer can exist for almost all our explanatory variables. For 
example, another recent literature deals with the role of capital buffer as a strategic variable to attract and 
monitor borrowers (Allen et al. (2011)) or to charge higher borrowing interest rates (Kim et al. (2005) and 
Fischer et al. (2009)). In our models, following the previous literature on the determinants of capital buffer, the 
only bank level variable which is considered as exogenous is the size of the bank.  
  
 
12 
different proxy variables, that market discipline is an important factor to explain banks’ 
capital ratios. Second, we split our market discipline indicator by separating junior from 
senior debt holders. We can see (column (2)) that both exert a significant pressure on banks to 
hold capital buffer. This result is shown through the high level of significance (at the 1% 
level) of the both positive coefficients associated with the variables mktdisc_senior and 
mktdisc_junior. However, consistent with the second hypothesis, the mktdisc_junior 
coefficient is 13 times higher than the one of mktdisc_senior
26
. 
The remaining columns of Table 3 present the results obtained by estimating models 
(1) and (2) on different sub-samples defined on the basis of the degree of involvement of the 
bank in non-traditional activities. Hence, we study whether the pressure of the market taken 
globally or the pressure of junior and senior debt holders taken separately on banks to hold 
capital buffer is different depending on their activity. We consider two different ratios to split 
banks into two different categories. When we consider the importance of trading activities 
through the ratio net trading revenue/ net operating income, we find that the ratio of market 
funded liabilities to total liabilities (mktdisc) is significant only for banks heavily involved in 
these activities (columns (3) and (4)). Consistent with hypothesis H3, this result implies that 
market participants exert a pressure only on banks that are highly involved in trading 
activities which are imperfectly taken into account in the current capital regulation. When we 
distinguish senior debt holders from junior debt holders, we notice that this result holds only 
for senior debt holders, junior debt holders always exert a pressure, whatever the importance 
of trading activities (columns (5) and (6)). The significance and the comparative high value of 
the coefficient of the mktdisc_junior variable irrespective of the bank’s activity denote the 
high pressure exerted by these junior debt holders on banks to hold capital buffer. Using the 
ratio off-balance sheet activities/ total assets as an alternative criterion to separate banks gives 
similar results (columns (7)-(10)). Indeed, the market funding variable (mktdisc) is significant 
at the five percent level only for banks that have a high proportion of off-balance sheet 
activities that is for banks highly involved in non-traditional activities whereas it is not 
significant for banks with a low ratio. Besides, we also find that this result holds for senior 
debt but is different for junior debt as the variable mktdisc_junior is significant whatever the 
importance of off-balance sheet activities.  
To summarize, our results validate our three hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. Consistent 
with H1, we find that, after controlling for other determinants, market discipline is a 
                                                 
26
 Besides, these two coefficients are statistically different at the one percent level of significance. 
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significant determinant of banks’ capital buffer. Both senior debt holders and junior debt 
holders seem to exert a pressure on banks to hold capital buffer. However, as assumed in 
hypothesis H2, this pressure is higher for junior debt holders. In accordance with hypothesis 
H3, we find a higher pressure of market discipline on banks highly involved in non-traditional 
activities. Indeed, for banks highly involved in non-traditional activities, our market discipline 
indicators are always significant to explain bank capital buffer. By contrast, for those less 
involved in such activities, the importance of market funded liabilities as a whole is always 
insignificant to explain capital buffer. However, the behavior of senior and junior debt holders 
appears different: senior debt holders do not exert a pressure on such banks whereas junior 
debt holders do. Thus, junior debt holders exert a pressure on banks to hold capital buffer 
whatever the importance of non-traditional activities. 
  
These results might suggest that senior debt holders exert a pressure to hold capital 
buffer on banks heavily involved in non-traditional activities because these activities are not 
well taken into account by the capital regulation. The buffer required by senior debt holders 
would reflect the capital needed for the risks not correctly embedded into the capital 
constraint. This would explain why they do not exert a pressure on banks mainly involved in 
traditional activities: the risks generated by these activities are already taken into account in 
the capital constraint. By contrast, junior debt holders always require capital buffer whatever 
banks' activities. This result might be due to the junior status of these debt holders: they are 
particularly at risk in case of bank default which might explain that they require higher capital 
buffer. Irrespective of banks’ activities, they require capital buffer because they find the 
capital required by regulation insufficient even for traditional activities.    
Regarding the control variables, we can notice that the coefficient of the loan activity 
variable nla is almost always negative and highly significant. This expected finding shows 
that banks highly involved in credit activities hold less capital buffer. We also confirm the 
well known result which stipulates that large banks operate with less capital buffer than small 
banks (Ayuso et al. (2004) for instance). In fact, our variable size has a negative and 
significant coefficient across almost all our specifications. The peer pressure variable comp is 
significant in 6 out of 10 of our specifications and its coefficient is positive as expected. 
Therefore, consistent with the findings from Lindquist (2004) and Alfon et al. (2004), the 
higher the peer pressure is, the higher capital buffer banks hold. In addition, we can notice 
that it is more significant for banks highly involved in non-traditional activities and hence the 
bank peer discipline seems consistent with the market discipline. The loan growth variable 
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(loang) is significant in some specifications and its coefficient has the expected negative sign. 
The risk variable llpnl is not significant; a result backed by Lindquist (2004) who shows with 
Norwegian data that risk is not a significant determinant of bank buffer under Basel I. 
Contrary to the results of Jokipii and Milne (2008), we find no significant relationship 
between the business cycle (gdpg) and bank capital buffer. 
 
 
3.2. Robustness checks 
Before checking the robustness of our results, we show in the first place that the 
significant and positive relationship between one of our variables of interest, mktdisc_junior, 
and regulatory capital buffer is not due to the potential inclusion of some of the subordinated 
debt in Tier 2 capital. Indeed, as we mentioned in section 2.2., we know that some 
subordinated debt can be eligible for Tier 2 and it consists in “conventional unsecured 
subordinated debt capital instruments with a minimum original fixed term to maturity of over 
five years and limited life redeemable preference shares. During the last five years to 
maturity, a cumulative discount (or amortization) factor of 20% per year will be applied to 
reflect the diminishing value of these instruments as a continuing source of strength” (BCBS, 
1988). Unfortunately, we cannot isolate subordinated debt included in Tier 2 using standard 
databases. Therefore, we redefine our mktdisc_junior variable by eliminating the part of 
subordinated debt that might be included in Tier 2
27
. More precisely, for each bank, we 
consider the whole amount of subordinated debt less the maximum amount that can be 
included in Tier 2 that is 50% of Tier 1 or the amount of Tier 2 if it is less than 50% of Tier 
1
28
. This restricts considerably our sample as we need to have information about the amount 
of both Tier 1 and Tier 2. Besides, this is a very restrictive definition of subordinated debt not 
included in Tier 2 as we cannot check for the maturity and the amortization factor. For these 
reasons, the regression model is run only using the whole sample. We define mktdisc_junior2 
as the ratio of subordinated debt non potentially eligible for Tier 2 to total liabilities and 
mktdisc2 as the ratio of total market funding less subordinated debt potentially eligible for 
Tier 2 to total liabilities. The results obtained using these variables are presented in Table 4.  
 
< Insert Table 4 > 
 
                                                 
27
 Tier 2 is limited to 100% of Tier 1 and subordinated debt is limited to 50% of Tier 1. 
28
 If we find an amount of subordinated debt not eligible for Tier 2 which is negative, we normalize it to zero. 
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We find a highly significant (at 1% level) and positive relationship between mktdisc2 
and capital buffer as before. More importantly, despite the high restrictions imposed on our 
new variable mktdisc_junior2, consistent with our main results, we still find a positive 
relationship between this restricted new variable reflecting the pressure of junior debt holders 
(mktdisc_junior2) and capital buffer even if less significant (at 10% instead of 1% level). 
Moreover, our second hypothesis (H2) is still validated as the coefficient magnitude of 
mktdisc_junior2 is more than 5 times higher than that of mktdisc_senior. Overall, we conclude 
that the positive and significant relationship between mktdisc_junior and capital buffer is not 
mechanically driven by the potential inclusion of some subordinated debt into Tier 2 capital.  
 
  We then perform several robustness checks reported in appendix in Tables A2 to A9. 
First, in our regressions, we consider capital buffer of banks without any restriction. 
To check the robustness of our results, we perform new regressions restricting our sample to 
(1) positive capital buffer and, (2) capital buffer higher than 1, to deal with the issue that 
buffers could be explained by the fear of falling below the minimum regulatory requirement. 
We re-run all the regressions and we obtain the same conclusions (see Tables A2 and A3).  
Second, we perform a robustness check regarding a potential sample bias. French and 
Italian banks are comparatively more represented in our sample. To make sure that our results 
do not depend on this unbalanced sample representation, we run again all our regressions by 
excluding the banks from these two countries. We also find that the conclusions remain 
globally unchanged (Table A4). The only noticeable difference is that the market discipline 
variable mktdisc_junior is no longer significant for banks with a low proportion of off-balance 
sheet activities.  
Third, banks in United Kingdom are somewhat differently regulated compared to other 
European banks in our sample (cf 2.2. and FSA (2001)
29
 for details). Therefore, in our main 
regressions, we consider 9% (instead of 8%) as the minimum regulatory capital requirement. 
Thus, to ensure that this particular aspect of British banks regulation does not distort our 
results, we repeat all the regressions by excluding them. All our conclusions remain similar 
(Table A5). In order to take into account other potential differences in terms of capital 
regulation across European countries, we also introduce a capital regulatory variable. This 
country level variable is constructed from the databases of Barth et al. (2000, 2003, and 2007) 
                                                 
29
 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Policy/Policy/2001/pscapitalratios.shtml 
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and is a measure of capital regulatory stringency
30
. This variable appears significant in only 
two regressions and our conclusions remain the same (Table A6).   
Fourth, we can suspect that some banks in our sample have experienced mergers and 
acquisitions during the considered period. Unfortunately, we have no direct way to identify 
those banks. An indirect way to do so is to look at the bank’s total assets growth. Hence, we 
compute the total assets growth rate and we exclude banks that have experienced a growth 
rate exceeding 40 %
31
. We find similar results except that the market discipline variable 
mktdisc_junior is no longer significant for banks with a low proportion of trading revenues 
(Table A7).  
Fifth, concerning the separation of our sample in two sub-samples on the basis of the 
values of the ratios net trading revenue to net operating income and off-balance sheet 
activities to total assets, we consider another criterion than the median. In order to have sub-
samples of banks with very different characteristics in terms of activity, we consider the 
median value of the considered ratio and delete the 10% of our sample observations with a 
value of the ratio around the median. Then, we separate banks with low values from banks 
with high values. This criterion ensures that banks in the high category one year are not in the 
low category the year after. Using this criterion leads to similar conclusions (Table A8). 
Finally, as we consider a broad definition of senior debt corresponding to total 
liabilities minus total deposits and subordinated debt, we decide to check the robustness of our 
results using a narrower definition that focuses only on total money market funding. Total 
money market funding corresponds to certificates of deposits, commercial paper, debt 
securities, securities loaned and other securities.  Thus, our senior debt variable 
mktdisc_senior2 consists of total money market funding/ total liabilities. Our conclusions 
concerning the discipline exerted by senior debt holders remain unchanged even though the 
significance of the new senior debt variable (mktdisc_senior2) becomes slightly lower 
compared with our main results (Table A9). 
 
                                                 
30
 To construct this variable, we use the 2000 database for the 1992-2000 period, the 2003 database for the 2001-
2003 period and the 2007 database for the 2004-2006 period. This variable corresponds to the capital regulatory 
index defined in Barth et al. (2004). 
31
 As there is no objective cut-off, we have considered other percentages less restrictive (50%) and more 
restrictive (30%) and we have found similar conclusions.  
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4. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to investigate firstly whether market participants taken 
globally lead banks to hold a capital ratio higher than the minimum regulatory capital 
requirement. Secondly, we went a step further and studied whether market participants who 
are highly exposed to losses in case of bank failure (junior debt holders) exert a higher 
pressure than those (senior debt holders) less exposed to it. Finally, we investigated if market 
participants, taken globally or not, differentiate banks according to their involvement in non-
traditional activities inappropriately taken into account in the Basel capital regulation 
framework. 
Using an unbalanced panel data of European commercial banks from 16 countries on 
1993-2006, our results show that, after controlling for other determinants of capital buffer, the 
higher the reliance on market funding is, the higher capital buffer banks hold. We also show 
that when we distinguish junior from senior debt holders, although they both have a positive 
impact on capital buffer, the former exert a higher pressure on banks to hold capital buffer due 
to their junior status. When we differentiate traditional from non-traditional bank activities, 
our results indicate that market players taken as a whole require capital buffer only for non-
traditional activities reflecting the idea that they take into account the slow reaction of 
regulators concerning the rapid changes of bank activities. Besides, contrary to senior debt 
holders, junior debt holders do not distinguish banks according to their activities and exert a 
pressure whatever the importance of non-traditional activities. 
 
These results highlight the benefits of the use of market discipline in complement to 
capital regulation: banks subject to market discipline behave more prudently as the pressure 
exerted by debt holders leads them to hold higher capital buffer. Besides, consistent with the 
proposals for mandatory subordinated debt, we show that this debt is the most disciplining 
one: junior debt holders exert a pressure on banks to hold capital buffer whatever their 
activities and this pressure is always higher than the one exerted by senior debt holders. 
However, one of the limits of mandatory subordinated debt is that due to its cost, it cannot be 
implemented for all banks. Interestingly, our results indicate that senior debt can also be an 
effective tool for market discipline. Indeed, we find that senior debt holders require capital 
buffers for banks involved in non-traditional activities that is when capital regulation is 
supposed to be the less efficient.  
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Table 1: Presentation of the dependent and independent variables with their descriptive statistics on our sample period (1993-2006)
                                                 
33
 Notice that in our regressions, the variable roe corresponds to the residuals of the regression of the Return on Equity on our profit variable (see footnote 17). 
34
 Net loans are: gross loans – loan loss reserves. 
35
 Total market funding corresponds to Total Liabilities minus total deposits.  
36
 Other market funding corresponds to Total Liabilities minus total deposits minus subordinated debt. 
Variable Mnemonic Definition Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Expected Sign 
of the coefficient 
Capital buffer buffer 
((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/Risk-weighted 
assets) - regulatory minimum requirements 
4.72 3.70 4.45 -6.48 33.30  
Profitability profit Post tax profit/ Total assets 0.69 0.63 0.78 -5.56 8.26 + 
Equity cost roe Return on equity = Net income/ Equity
33
 9.53 10.18 10.49 -98.81 56.37 - 
risk llpnl Loan loss provisions/ Net loans  0.96 0.66 1.10 0.00 15.65 -/+ 
Peer discipline comp 
Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the 
same country 
6.29 6.01 1.87 2.03 13.62 + 
Asset structure nla Net loans
34
/ Total assets 56.33 56.84 17.82 2.12 95.37 - 
Market discipline 
mktdisc Total market funding
35
/ Total liabilities 23.27 21.86 16.81 0.48 87.43 + 
mktdisc_junior Subordinated debt/ Total liabilities 1.87 1.74 1.59 0.00 13.59 + 
mktdisc_senior Other market funding
36
/ Total liabilities 21.39 19.92 16.74 0.48 85.92 + 
Credit demand loang Annual net loan growth rate 11.28 9.51 20.43 -75.41 234.18 - 
Economic cycle gdpg 
Annual growth rate of the real gross 
domestic product (deseasonalized) 
2.38 2.24 1.76 -0.99 15.43 - 
Size size Natural logarithm of total assets 15.44 15.46 2.34 10.40 20.63 - 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on average over the period 1993-2006 
 
 
 Full sample of commercial banks 
available in Bankscope  
Our sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Total assets 13 185.34 66 569.40  44 929.00 105 000.00 
Total deposits/ total assets 
 
 
70.16 21.64 70.67 14.78 
Net loans/ total assets 48.25 28.39 56.33 17.82 
Loan loss provisions/ total 
assets 
0.62 1.00 0.52 0.57 
Return on assets = Net 
income/ total assets 
0.76 3.05 0.72 0.82 
Net trading revenue/ Net 
operating income 
9.41 24.81 7.52 8.62 
Equity/ Total assets 10.55 8.99 7.42 3.94 
Tier 1/ risk weighted 
assets 
11.29 6.96 9.37 4.09 
(Tier 1 + Tier 2)/ risk 
weighted assets 
14.24 6.41 12.80 4.47 
Off-balance sheet 
activities/ total assets 
28.59 75.87 26.00 27.50 
 
All variables are expressed in percentages, except Total assets which is in millions of Euros. 
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Table 3: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation 
Model 1: 
, 0 1 , , ,
1
                                           
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

        
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
          _ _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc senior mktdisc junior C u     

        
 
Eq Name: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Model: Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Sample: Whole sample 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating 
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) 
low 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) 
low 
(Off-
balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total 
assets) 
high 
(Off-
balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total 
assets) low 
(Off-
balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total 
assets) 
high 
(Off-
balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total 
assets) low 
           
           
Mktdisc  0.084   0.106  0.047    0.107  0.098   
 (3.824)***  (3.590)*** (1.069)   (2.371)** (0.714)   
Mktdisc _Senior   0.065    0.093  0.006    0.100  0.046 
  (3.083)***   (2.940)*** (0.131)   (2.353)** (0.663) 
Mktdisc_Junior   0.892    0.690  0.862    0.793  1.055 
  (3.815)***   (3.759)*** (2.362)**   (2.852)*** (3.484)*** 
Nla -0.118 -0.136 -0.096 -0.121 -0.107 -0.145 -0.067 -0.177 -0.087 -0.172 
 (-5.489)*** (-6.243)*** (-3.644)*** (-3.093)*** (-3.480)*** (-3.445)*** (-1.124) (-3.364)*** (-1.348) (-5.185)*** 
Size -2.672 -2.720 -2.129 -1.723 -2.211 -1.794 -0.921 -4.730 -0.985 -4.012 
 (-6.216)*** (-6.018)*** (-4.603)*** (-1.594) (-4.353)*** (-1.330) (-0.616) (-2.094)** (-0.654) (-3.405)*** 
Comp  0.178  0.208  0.270  0.033  0.272  0.082  0.200 -0.010  0.204 -0.026 
 (2.231)** (2.343)** (3.755)*** (0.382) (3.447)*** (0.974) (1.917)* (-0.058) (1.878)* (-0.270) 
Gdpg  0.057  0.032  0.014  0.170 -0.008  0.155  0.045 -0.278  0.028 -0.153 
 (1.253) (0.727) (0.298) (0.965) (-0.156) (0.761) (0.494) (-0.563) (0.306) (-0.616) 
Roe -0.001  0.037 -0.122 -0.012 -0.019 -0.029 -0.041  0.042  0.026 -0.086 
 (-0.031) (0.762) (-0.992) (-0.151) (-0.131) (-0.311) (-0.154) (0.130) (0.096) (-0.447) 
Llpnl -0.875 -1.113 -0.998  1.222 -1.377  1.837 -0.403 -1.730 -0.279 -0.685 
 (-0.645) (-0.732) (-0.898) (0.591) (-0.984) (0.766) (-0.293) (-0.334) (-0.202) (-0.320) 
Loang -0.012 -0.016 -0.014  0.000 -0.018  0.002 -0.021 -0.010 -0.023 -0.006 
 (-1.319) (-1.489) (-1.763)* (0.015) (-1.831)* (0.163) (-2.953)*** (-0.364) (-3.060)*** (-0.492) 
Profit  0.654  0.256  0.954  2.771  0.327  3.034  3.247  1.671  3.181  0.862 
 (0.742) (0.255) (1.196) (1.519) (0.303) (1.452) (0.556) (1.192) (0.539) (0.749) 
Constant  49.978  51.055  39.759  33.356  41.641  34.191  16.853  87.346  17.617  74.999 
 (7.087)*** (6.909)*** (5.454)*** (1.849)* (5.202)*** (1.521) (0.535) (2.314)** (0.557) (3.897)*** 
           
           
Nb of Obs.: 1902 1902 951 951 951 951 952 951 952 951 
R-squared: 0.806 0.805 0.870 0.854 0.855 0.852 0.746 0.782 0.731 0.853 
           
           
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of the one year lagged value 
of the endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. Trading revenue/ net operating income is 
considered as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (6.10%). Off-balance sheet activities/ 
total assets is considered as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (18.13%). Standard errors 
are adjusted robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are 
between parentheses. Variables definition: Buffer = ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum 
requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ Total assets ; Mktdisc_Junior = Subordinated debt/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior = Other market 
funding/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc = Total market funding/ total liabilities ; Logta = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Comp = 
Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the same country ; Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product 
(deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we regress the ratio (Net Income/ Total Equity) on the profit variable ; Llpnl 
= Loan loss provisions/ Net loans ; Loang = Annual net loan growth ; Profit = Post tax profit/ Total assets. 
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Table 4: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation excluding 
subordinated debt potentially eligible for Tier 2. 
Model 1: 
, 0 1 , , ,
1
2                                            
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

        
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
2           _ _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc senior mktdisc junior C u     

        
 
Eq Name: (1) (2) 
Model: Model 1 Model 2 
Sample: Whole sample 
   
   Mktdisc2  0.096  
 (3.763)***  
Mktdisc_Senior   0.092 
  (3.672)*** 
Mktdisc_Junior2   0.504 
  (1.697)* 
Nla -0.148 -0.148 
 (-7.287)*** (-7.309)*** 
Size -3.077 -3.125 
 (-5.322)*** (-5.395)*** 
Comp  0.057  0.054 
 (0.804) (0.765) 
Gdpg  0.023  0.015 
 (0.237) (0.157) 
Roe -0.101 -0.092 
 (-1.466) (-1.376) 
Llpnl -0.279 -0.239 
 (-0.395) (-0.337) 
Loang -0.009 -0.010 
 (-1.384) (-1.502) 
Profit  1.237  1.161 
 (2.880)*** (2.734)*** 
Constant  57.481  58.244 
 (6.260)*** (6.328)*** 
   
   Nb of Obs.: 1249 1249 
R-squared: 0.838 0.837 
   
   
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of one the year lagged value of the 
endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted robust to heteroskedasticity. 
***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are between parentheses. Variables definition: Buffer = 
((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ Total assets ; Mktdisc_Junior2 = 
(Total Subordinated debt- subordinated debt potentially eligible for Tier 2)/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior = Other market funding/ total 
liabilities ; Mktdisc2 = (Total market funding - subordinated debt potentially eligible for Tier 2) / total liabilities ; Logta = Natural 
logarithm of total assets ; Comp = Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the same country ; Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross 
domestic product (deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we regress the ratio (Net Income/ Total Equity) on the profit 
variable ; Llpnl = Loan loss provisions/ Net loans ; Loang = Annual net loan growth ; Profit = Post tax profit/ Total assets. 
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APPENDIX:  
 
Table A1: Distribution of banks by country and percentage of the total banking assets of 
each country present in our sample in 2006 
Country 
Number of 
banks 
Percentage of the total banking assets present in our 
final sample  
Austria 19 12.60 
Belgium 18 74.53 
Denmark 65 22.98 
Finland 11 51.07 
France 147 73.27 
Germany 28 45.31 
Greece 18 61.94 
Ireland 14 68.83 
Italy 198 67.94 
Netherlands 50 67.84 
Norway 21 66.50 
Portugal 20 67.93 
Spain 31 67.84 
Sweden 31 69.39 
Switzerland 20 22.64 
United Kingdom 51 68.56 
Total 742 56.82 
Source: Bankscope Fitch IBCA 
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Table A2: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation: the case of 
banks with positive buffer.  
Model 1: 
, 0 1 , , ,
1
                                           
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

        
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
          _ _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc senior mktdisc junior C u     

        
 
Eq Name: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Model: Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Sample: Whole sample 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating 
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
           
           
Mktdisc  0.098   0.118  0.077    0.118  0.087   
 (3.200)***  (3.471)*** (1.218)   (2.695)*** (1.240)   
Mktdisc_Senior   0.076    0.105  0.038    0.113  0.061 
  (2.688)***   (2.747)*** (0.778)   (2.752)*** (1.067) 
Mktdisc_Junior   0.903    0.615  0.927    0.850  0.983 
  (3.082)***   (3.269)*** (2.414)**   (3.367)*** (2.532)** 
Nla -0.123 -0.141 -0.091 -0.128 -0.098 -0.143 -0.085 -0.176 -0.097 -0.179 
 (-5.140)*** (-5.970)*** (-2.550)** (-3.506)*** (-2.215)** (-4.108)*** (-1.866)* (-4.678)*** (-1.879)* (-5.447)*** 
Size -2.436 -2.601 -1.858 -1.975 -1.917 -1.585 -0.816 -4.689 -1.070 -4.158 
 (-5.452)*** (-5.628)*** (-3.009)*** (-2.109)** (-2.515)** (-1.624) (-0.511) (-3.053)*** (-0.627) (-3.231)*** 
Comp  0.159  0.191  0.287  0.015  0.302  0.055  0.189 -0.042  0.185 -0.050 
 (1.562) (1.670)* (2.647)*** (0.166) (2.250)** (0.662) (2.058)** (-0.372) (1.823)* (-0.519) 
Gdpg  0.058  0.029  0.004  0.160 -0.015  0.171  0.047 -0.219  0.023 -0.178 
 (1.172) (0.620) (0.071) (0.885) (-0.229) (0.953) (0.472) (-0.899) (0.218) (-0.877) 
Roe -0.098 -0.034 -0.106 -0.091 -0.012 -0.131 -0.152  0.002 -0.005 -0.124 
 (-1.004) (-0.296) (-0.673) (-1.036) (-0.060) (-1.417) (-0.302) (0.008) (-0.009) (-0.488) 
Llpnl -1.266 -1.450 -1.419 -0.022 -1.889  0.269 -0.876 -1.122 -0.564 -1.185 
 (-0.695) (-0.728) (-0.744) (-0.010) (-0.755) (0.128) (-1.049) (-0.584) (-0.611) (-0.949) 
Loang -0.012 -0.015 -0.015 -0.002 -0.019 -0.002 -0.021 -0.003 -0.023 -0.003 
 (-1.071) (-1.201) (-1.374) (-0.284) (-1.343) (-0.316) (-2.878)*** (-0.259) (-2.901)*** (-0.425) 
Profit  0.459  0.056  0.828  1.814  0.211  2.663  2.636  1.258  2.804  0.770 
 (0.416) (0.046) (0.707) (1.129) (0.133) (1.566) (0.518) (1.615) (0.509) (0.839) 
Constant  47.068  49.927  35.522  38.959  36.963  32.139  17.173  86.910  19.905  78.314 
 (6.483)*** (6.628)*** (3.711)*** (2.451)** (3.135)*** (1.971)** (0.562) (3.515)*** (0.609) (3.865)*** 
           
           
Nb of Obs.: 1834 1834 922 912 922 912 925 910 925 910 
R-squared: 0.798 0.799 0.856 0.861 0.826 0.865 0.782 0.827 0.760 0.850 
           
           
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of the one year lagged value of the 
endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. Trading revenue/ net operating income is considered as 
high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (6.10%). Off-balance sheet activities/ total assets is 
considered as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (18.13%). Standard errors are adjusted robust 
to heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are between parentheses. Variables 
definition: Buffer = ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ Total assets ; 
Mktdisc_Junior = Subordinated debt/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior = Other market funding/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc = Total market 
funding/ total liabilities ; Logta = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Comp = Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the same country ; 
Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we regress the ratio (Net 
Income/ Total Equity) on the profit variable ; Llpnl = Loan loss provisions/ Net loans ; Loang = Annual net loan growth ; Profit = Post 
tax profit/ Total assets. 
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Table A3: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation: the case of 
banks with a buffer of more than 1%. 
Model 1: 
, 0 1 , , ,
1
                                           
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

        
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
          _ _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc senior mktdisc junior C u     

        
 
Eq Name: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Model: Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Sample: Whole sample 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating 
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
           
           
Mktdisc  0.124   0.135  0.074    0.108  0.103   
 (2.015)**  (3.676)*** (1.004)   (2.179)** (1.551)   
Mktdisc_Senior   0.099    0.117  0.032    0.100  0.062 
  (1.725)*   (2.572)** (0.525)   (1.905)* (1.223) 
Mktdisc_Junior   0.998    0.553  0.837    0.856  1.094 
  (2.201)**   (2.513)** (2.030)**   (2.873)*** (2.994)*** 
Nla -0.115 -0.135 -0.088 -0.128 -0.090 -0.136 -0.075 -0.186 -0.091 -0.186 
 (-3.065)*** (-3.894)*** (-1.562) (-3.824)*** (-1.101) (-4.086)*** (-1.447) (-4.843)*** (-1.539) (-5.422)*** 
Size -2.177 -2.440 -1.242 -1.973 -1.577 -1.494  0.461 -5.008  0.465 -4.355 
 (-3.817)*** (-4.036)*** (-1.676)* (-2.008)** (-1.780)* (-1.428) (0.140) (-4.130)*** (0.115) (-4.779)*** 
Comp  0.190  0.232  0.297  0.032  0.355  0.070  0.204 -0.041  0.197 -0.038 
 (0.915) (0.979) (1.133) (0.365) (0.997) (0.864) (1.532) (-0.434) (1.233) (-0.463) 
Gdpg  0.071  0.044  0.005  0.140 -0.007  0.148  0.063 -0.156  0.060 -0.100 
 (1.182) (0.848) (0.094) (0.843) (-0.122) (0.856) (0.685) (-0.936) (0.567) (-0.686) 
Roe -0.099 -0.003 -0.187 -0.115 -0.024 -0.147 -0.288  0.016 -0.295 -0.093 
 (-0.577) (-0.012) (-0.507) (-1.331) (-0.053) (-1.655)* (-0.395) (0.089) (-0.326) (-0.509) 
Llpnl -1.718 -1.855 -1.658  0.712 -2.294  1.065 -1.194 -0.223 -0.637 -0.099 
 (-0.530) (-0.528) (-0.521) (0.417) (-0.515) (0.662) (-1.855)* (-0.173) (-0.956) (-0.108) 
Loang -0.018 -0.021 -0.018 -0.001 -0.023 -0.002 -0.025 -0.001 -0.027 -0.002 
 (-0.791) (-0.844) (-0.919) (-0.177) (-0.869) (-0.229) (-2.888)*** (-0.177) (-2.640)*** (-0.303) 
Profit  0.445  0.047  0.841  1.964  0.127  2.925  3.016  1.983  4.588  1.918 
 (0.278) (0.026) (0.444) (0.970) (0.050) (1.272) (0.532) (0.963) (0.706) (0.902) 
Constant  42.582  46.820  25.755  38.256  31.453  29.731 -2.312  90.942 -4.776  79.877 
 (4.639)*** (4.812)*** (2.216)** (2.341)** (2.225)** (1.686)* (-0.041) (4.557)*** (-0.070) (5.409)*** 
           
           
Nb of Obs.: 1669 1669 847 821 847 821 859 811 859 811 
R-squared: 0.760 0.757 0.843 0.860 0.794 0.859 0.742 0.837 0.696 0.863 
           
           
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of the one year lagged value of the 
endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. Trading revenue/ net operating income is considered as 
high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (6.10%). Off-balance sheet activities/ total assets is considered 
as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (18.13%). Standard errors are adjusted robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are between parentheses. Variables 
definition: Buffer = ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ Total assets ; 
Mktdisc_Junior = Subordinated debt/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior = Other market funding/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc = Total market 
funding/ total liabilities ; Logta = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Comp = Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the same country ; 
Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we regress the ratio (Net 
Income/ Total Equity) on the profit variable ; Llpnl = Loan loss provisions/ Net loans ; Loang = Annual net loan growth ; Profit = Post tax 
profit/ Total assets. 
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Table A4: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation excluding 
French and Italian banks. 
Model 1: 
, 0 1 , , ,
1
                                           
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

        
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
          _ _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc senior mktdisc junior C u     

        
 
Eq Name: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Model: Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Sample: Whole sample 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating 
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
           
           
Mktdisc  0.079   0.151  0.076    0.127  0.152   
 (2.369)**  (2.482)** (1.255)   (1.822)* (1.238)   
Mktdisc_Senior   0.060    0.135  0.052    0.116  0.147 
  (2.122)**   (2.406)** (0.862)   (1.773)* (1.171) 
Mktdisc_Junior   0.777    0.567  1.112    0.776  0.291 
  (4.938)***   (2.653)*** (2.475)**   (3.671)*** (0.344) 
Nla -0.106 -0.124 -0.099 -0.113 -0.111 -0.135 -0.103 -0.166 -0.115 -0.167 
 (-4.270)*** (-4.898)*** (-2.753)*** (-2.297)** (-3.158)*** (-2.582)** (-1.725)* (-2.951)*** (-1.819)* (-2.927)*** 
Size -1.142 -1.497 -0.987 -0.101 -1.624  0.220 -0.501 -5.469 -0.488 -5.408 
 (-1.845)* (-2.628)*** (-0.958) (-0.068) (-1.961)* (0.142) (-0.208) (-2.537)** (-0.207) (-2.544)** 
Comp  0.131  0.166  0.204  0.120  0.217  0.146  0.172 -0.026  0.248 -0.030 
 (1.749)* (2.472)** (2.849)*** (1.083) (3.307)*** (1.373) (0.898) (-0.221) (1.301) (-0.250) 
Gdpg  0.047  0.032 -0.009  0.262 -0.012  0.275 -0.045 -0.502 -0.000 -0.503 
 (0.891) (0.689) (-0.170) (1.386) (-0.262) (1.420) (-0.668) (-1.518) (-0.007) (-1.567) 
Roe -0.213 -0.122 -0.284 -0.188 -0.173 -0.195 -0.009  0.205 -0.014  0.189 
 (-2.059)** (-1.392) (-1.671)* (-1.275) (-1.238) (-1.305) (-0.018) (0.819) (-0.029) (0.653) 
Llpnl -0.046 -0.082 -0.816  1.229 -0.886  1.325 -1.745 -0.881 -1.197 -0.901 
 (-0.054) (-0.109) (-0.915) (1.089) (-1.095) (1.179) (-3.265)*** (-0.413) (-2.330)** (-0.439) 
Loang -0.005 -0.009 -0.010 -0.005 -0.013 -0.004 -0.022  0.005 -0.025  0.005 
 (-0.533) (-1.052) (-1.097) (-0.330) (-1.430) (-0.270) (-2.656)*** (0.418) (-2.785)*** (0.423) 
Profit  1.682  1.296  1.452  5.013  0.991  5.800 -0.812  1.904  0.697  1.832 
 (2.637)*** (1.901)* (2.428)** (2.406)** (1.522) (2.703)*** (-0.330) (2.180)** (0.300) (1.735)* 
Constant  25.213  30.664  21.695  5.950  32.001 -0.083  18.486  99.184  15.022  98.232 
 (2.634)*** (3.401)*** (1.354) (0.245) (2.461)** (-0.003) (0.479) (2.783)*** (0.397) (2.806)*** 
           
           
Nb of Obs.: 1168 1168 610 558 610 558 629 539 629 539 
R-squared: 0.815 0.836 0.843 0.819 0.862 0.806 0.801 0.816 0.820 0.823 
           
           
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of one the year lagged value of the 
endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. Trading revenue/ net operating income is considered as 
high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the sample (6.10%). Off-balance sheet activities/ total assets is considered as 
high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (18.13%). Standard errors are adjusted robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are between parentheses. Variables 
definition: Buffer = ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ Total assets ; 
Mktdisc_Junior = Subordinated debt/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior = Other market funding/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc = Total market 
funding/ total liabilities ; Logta = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Comp = Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the same country ; 
Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we regress the ratio (Net 
Income/ Total Equity) on the profit variable ; Llpnl = Loan loss provisions/ Net loans; Loang = Annual net loan growth ; Profit = Post tax 
profit/ Total assets. 
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Table A5: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation excluding 
British banks. 
Model 1: 
, 0 1 , , ,
1
                                           
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

        
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
          _ _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc senior mktdisc junior C u     

        
 
Eq Name: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Model: Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Sample:          
           
           
Mktdisc  0.093   0.100  0.058    0.108  0.106   
 (3.675)***  (3.238)*** (1.590)   (2.358)** (0.954)   
Mktdisc_Senior   0.065    0.089  0.006    0.100  0.057 
  (3.083)***   (2.637)*** (0.197)   (2.337)** (0.836) 
Mktdisc_Junior   0.892    0.701  1.055    0.794  1.081 
  (3.815)***   (3.778)*** (3.329)***   (2.830)*** (3.589)*** 
Nla -0.109 -0.136 -0.086 -0.124 -0.095 -0.158 -0.069 -0.170 -0.090 -0.173 
 (-4.019)*** (-6.243)*** (-3.081)*** (-2.877)*** (-2.756)*** (-3.551)*** (-1.150) (-4.390)*** (-1.394) (-5.187)*** 
Size -2.809 -2.720 -2.148 -1.794 -2.380 -1.866 -0.970 -4.869 -1.063 -4.211 
 (-5.819)*** (-6.018)*** (-4.330)*** (-1.800)* (-4.530)*** (-1.715)* (-0.627) (-2.648)*** (-0.686) (-3.554)*** 
Comp  0.190  0.208  0.272  0.011  0.278  0.077  0.209  0.025  0.215  0.010 
 (1.730)* (2.343)** (3.403)*** (0.114) (3.002)*** (0.846) (1.523) (0.102) (1.521) (0.075) 
Gdpg  0.072  0.032  0.021  0.227 -0.004  0.184  0.049 -0.205  0.028 -0.136 
 (1.432) (0.727) (0.432) (1.497) (-0.083) (1.186) (0.517) (-0.625) (0.301) (-0.636) 
Roe  0.015  0.037 -0.118 -0.020  0.013 -0.033 -0.030  0.061  0.041 -0.036 
 (0.296) (0.762) (-0.811) (-0.229) (0.070) (-0.339) (-0.107) (0.231) (0.140) (-0.209) 
Llpnl -1.122 -1.113 -1.003  0.945 -1.436  1.436 -0.465 -1.681 -0.352 -1.002 
 (-0.633) (-0.732) (-0.864) (0.497) (-0.934) (0.723) (-0.311) (-0.403) (-0.235) (-0.466) 
Loang -0.015 -0.016 -0.015  0.000 -0.019  0.001 -0.022 -0.010 -0.023 -0.008 
 (-1.232) (-1.489) (-1.730)* (0.042) (-1.745)* (0.173) (-2.962)*** (-0.434) (-3.058)*** (-0.570) 
Profit  0.606  0.256  0.959  2.756  0.257  2.880  3.112  1.803  2.960  1.111 
 (0.597) (0.255) (1.144) (1.558) (0.217) (1.616) (0.510) (1.590) (0.483) (1.115) 
Constant  51.245  51.055  39.451  34.352  43.649  35.925  17.753  87.783  19.151  77.220 
 (6.570)*** (6.909)*** (5.106)*** (2.084)** (5.256)*** (2.010)** (0.549) (3.034)*** (0.593) (4.191)*** 
           
           
Nb of Obs.: 1766 1902 893 873 893 873 904 863 904 863 
R-squared: 0.783 0.805 0.869 0.846 0.846 0.852 0.734 0.767 0.721 0.837 
           
           
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of the one year lagged value of 
the endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. Trading revenue/ net operating income is 
considered as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the sample (6.10%). Off-balance sheet activities/ total assets is 
considered as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (18.13%). Standard errors are adjusted 
robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are between parentheses. 
Variables definition: Buffer = ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ 
Total assets ; Mktdisc_Junior = Subordinated debt/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior = Other market funding/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc 
= Total market funding/ total liabilities ; Logta = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Comp = Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the 
same country ; Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we 
regress the ratio (Net Income/ Total Equity) on the profit variable ; Llpnl = Loan loss provisions/ Net loans; Loang = Annual net loan 
growth ; Profit = Post tax profit/ Total assets. 
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Table A6: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation taking into 
account capital regulatory stringency 
Model 1: 
, 0 1 , , ,
1
                                           
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

        
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
          _ _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc senior mktdisc junior C u     

        
 
Eq Name: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Model: Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Sample: Whole sample 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating 
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
           
           
Mktdisc  0.086   0.110  0.046    0.077  0.070   
 (2.877)***  (3.395)*** (1.630)   (1.382) (1.125)   
Mktdisc_Senior   0.064    0.093  0.009    0.047  0.032 
  (2.310)**   (2.679)*** (0.330)   (0.865) (0.656) 
Mktdisc_Junior   0.977    0.678  0.820    1.052  1.101 
  (2.467)**   (3.188)*** (2.849)***   (2.214)** (3.517)*** 
Nla -0.108 -0.127 -0.087 -0.121 -0.102 -0.145  0.029 -0.161  0.007 -0.169 
 (-3.078)*** (-3.601)*** (-3.218)*** (-3.346)*** (-3.349)*** (-3.787)*** (0.126) (-4.844)*** (0.030) (-5.384)*** 
Size -2.483 -2.509 -2.020 -1.328 -2.134 -1.378  0.897 -4.254  0.839 -3.896 
 (-4.169)*** (-3.760)*** (-4.253)*** (-1.436) (-4.145)*** (-1.334) (0.178) (-4.042)*** (0.164) (-4.508)*** 
Comp  0.154  0.177  0.230 -0.092  0.240 -0.047 -0.055 -0.012 -0.073 -0.057 
 (1.226) (1.192) (2.375)** (-0.778) (2.171)** (-0.401) (-0.097) (-0.081) (-0.127) (-0.465) 
Gdpg  0.072  0.055 -0.007  0.306 -0.012  0.314  0.038 -0.197  0.032 -0.089 
 (1.396) (1.053) (-0.162) (1.802)* (-0.259) (1.721)* (0.279) (-0.685) (0.241) (-0.422) 
Roe  0.010  0.051 -0.101 -0.048 -0.024 -0.069 -0.096 -0.007  0.005 -0.112 
 (0.142) (0.535) (-0.907) (-0.593) (-0.164) (-0.762) (-0.177) (-0.042) (0.009) (-0.741) 
Llpnl -1.223 -1.573 -1.080  1.175 -1.399  1.682 -0.430 -0.900 -0.475 -0.258 
 (-0.533) (-0.569) (-0.859) (0.918) (-0.904) (1.301) (-0.172) (-0.419) (-0.183) (-0.191) 
Loang -0.015 -0.019 -0.015  0.000 -0.018  0.001 -0.030 -0.006 -0.035 -0.004 
 (-0.953) (-1.006) (-1.805)* (0.040) (-1.793)* (0.145) (-1.830)* (-0.460) (-1.917)* (-0.409) 
Profit  0.733  0.354  0.966  3.191  0.447  3.511  6.137  1.546  5.995  0.792 
 (0.692) (0.272) (1.227) (1.771)* (0.420) (1.857)* (0.438) (1.618) (0.423) (0.737) 
Cap_index -0.220 -0.301 -0.413 -0.732 -0.298 -0.778 -1.495  0.227 -1.504 -0.079 
 (-1.045) (-1.486) (-1.271) (-1.935)* (-0.778) (-1.967)** (-0.568) (0.457) (-0.564) (-0.175) 
Constant  48.289  49.610  40.593  32.116  42.331  32.952 -6.016  77.691 -4.872  73.484 
 (4.787)*** (4.458)*** (5.169)*** (2.165)** (4.860)*** (2.029)** (-0.073) (4.647)*** (-0.059) (5.250)*** 
           
           
Nb of Obs.: 1864 1864 927 937 927 937 922 943 922 943 
R-squared: 0.785 0.772 0.869 0.851 0.856 0.853 0.466 0.828 0.387 0.859 
           
           
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of the one year lagged value of 
the endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. Trading revenue/ net operating income is 
considered as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the sample (6.10%). Off-balance sheet activities/ total assets is 
considered as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (18.13%). Standard errors are adjusted 
robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are between parentheses. 
Variables definition: Buffer = ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ 
Total assets ; Mktdisc_Junior = Subordinated debt/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior = Other market funding/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc 
= Total market funding/ total liabilities ; Logta = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Comp = Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the 
same country ; Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we 
regress the ratio (Net Income/ Total Equity) on the profit variable ; Llpnl = Loan loss provisions/ Net loans; Loang = Annual net loan 
growth ; Profit = Post tax profit/ Total assets; Cap_index is a capital regulatory stringency index from Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004). It ranges from 0 to 9, with a higher value indicating greater stringency. 
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Table A7: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation excluding banks 
that might have experienced M&A. 
Model 1: 
, 0 1 , , ,
1
                                           
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

        
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
          _ _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc senior mktdisc junior C u     

        
 
Eq Name: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Model: Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Sample: Whole sample 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating 
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) 
high 
(Trading 
revenue/ 
net 
operating  
income) low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
           
           
Mktdisc  0.087   0.098  0.039    0.117  0.108   
 (3.669)***  (3.654)*** (0.510)   (2.264)** (0.711)   
Mktdisc_Senior   0.070    0.084  0.002    0.108  0.064 
  (3.061)***   (2.892)*** (0.027)   (2.221)** (0.837) 
Mktdisc_Junior   0.874    0.657  0.867    0.895  1.089 
  (3.990)***   (3.562)*** (1.572)   (3.272)*** (3.629)*** 
Nla -0.125 -0.143 -0.106 -0.124 -0.114 -0.140 -0.093 -0.175 -0.114 -0.171 
 (-6.237)*** (-6.949)*** (-3.929)*** (-3.661)*** (-3.585)*** (-4.011)*** (-1.296) (-2.929)*** (-1.545) (-4.895)*** 
Size -2.559 -2.631 -1.873 -1.939 -1.880 -1.993 -1.096 -5.359 -1.182 -4.756 
 (-5.532)*** (-5.392)*** (-3.494)*** (-1.542) (-2.928)*** (-1.321) (-0.598) (-1.992)** (-0.633) (-3.377)*** 
Comp  0.191  0.217  0.269  0.010  0.259  0.061  0.225 -0.004  0.230 -0.019 
 (2.249)** (2.327)** (4.030)*** (0.090) (3.703)*** (0.575) (1.842)* (-0.018) (1.785)* (-0.173) 
Gdpg  0.047  0.022  0.014  0.136 -0.009  0.126  0.024 -0.352  0.001 -0.244 
 (1.024) (0.490) (0.278) (0.592) (-0.162) (0.471) (0.215) (-0.664) (0.009) (-0.895) 
Roe -0.002  0.035 -0.141 -0.019 -0.052 -0.033 -0.004  0.120  0.068 -0.003 
 (-0.054) (0.759) (-1.180) (-0.204) (-0.384) (-0.309) (-0.013) (0.303) (0.200) (-0.015) 
Llpnl -0.886 -1.110 -1.036  2.726 -1.458  3.267 -0.712 -1.801 -0.618 -0.855 
 (-0.534) (-0.604) (-0.873) (0.859) (-0.963) (0.904) (-0.368) (-0.317) (-0.308) (-0.337) 
Loang -0.023 -0.026 -0.025 -0.003 -0.028 -0.001 -0.033 -0.021 -0.036 -0.014 
 (-1.511) (-1.535) (-1.854)* (-0.197) (-1.770)* (-0.062) (-2.570)** (-0.553) (-2.697)*** (-0.754) 
Profit  0.994  0.634  1.046  3.517  0.430  3.770  2.836  2.185  2.783  1.336 
 (1.084) (0.606) (1.317) (1.450) (0.401) (1.321) (0.335) (1.321) (0.321) (1.148) 
Constant  48.318  49.689  36.397  35.251  37.116  35.325  21.336  96.637  22.461  85.983 
 (6.504)*** (6.357)*** (4.391)*** (1.730)* (3.769)*** (1.435) (0.530) (2.153)** (0.548) (3.699)*** 
           
           
Nb of Obs.: 1814 1814 903 911 903 911 917 898 917 898 
R-squared: 0.790 0.790 0.869 0.804 0.855 0.782 0.726 0.729 0.698 0.840 
           
           
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of the one year lagged value of the 
endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. Trading revenue/ net operating income is considered as 
high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (6.10%). Off-balance sheet activities/ total assets is considered 
as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (18.13%). Standard errors are adjusted robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are between parentheses. Variables 
definition: Buffer = ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ Total assets ; 
Mktdisc_Junior = Subordinated debt/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior = Other market funding/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc = Total market 
funding/ total liabilities ; Logta = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Comp = Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the same country ; 
Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we regress the ratio (Net 
Income/ Total Equity) on the profit variable ; Llpnl = Loan loss provisions/ Net loans; Loang = Annual net loan growth ; Profit = Post tax 
profit/ Total assets. 
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Table A8: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation 
considering another criterion to define sub-samples. 
Model 1: 
, 0 1 , , ,
1
                                           
J
i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer mktdisc C u    

        
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
          _ _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer C umktdisc senior mktdisc junior     

        
Eq Name: (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Model: Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Sample: 
(Trading 
revenue/ net 
operating 
income) high 
(Trading 
revenue/ net 
operating  
income) low 
(Trading 
revenue/ net 
operating  
income) high 
(Trading 
revenue/ net 
operating  
income) low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
high 
(Off-balance 
sheet 
activities/ 
total assets) 
low 
         
         
Mktdisc  0.098  0.043    0.089  0.060   
 (2.687)*** (1.327)   (1.866)* (0.875)   
Mktdisc_Senior    0.084  0.005    0.087  0.011 
   (1.686)* (0.157)   (1.964)* (0.238) 
Mktdisc_Junior    0.739  0.897    0.552  1.190 
   (2.207)** (2.469)**   (1.734)* (4.043)*** 
Nla -0.074 -0.127 -0.080 -0.145 -0.047 -0.204 -0.059 -0.205 
 (-1.328) (-2.799)*** (-0.954) (-3.122)*** (-0.798) (-5.153)*** (-1.006) (-6.356)*** 
Size -2.020 -1.261 -2.121 -1.434 -0.712 -4.064 -0.715 -3.412 
 (-2.626)*** (-1.326) (-1.926)* (-1.323) (-0.504) (-3.420)*** (-0.515) (-4.365)*** 
Comp  0.328  0.067  0.346  0.128  0.182  0.006  0.186  0.027 
 (2.509)** (0.671) (1.692)* (1.328) (2.108)** (0.053) (2.111)** (0.274) 
Gdpg -0.040  0.194 -0.087  0.164  0.067 -0.230  0.056 -0.070 
 (-0.335) (1.123) (-0.428) (0.863) (0.652) (-0.841) (0.556) (-0.397) 
Roe -0.068  0.000  0.124 -0.005 -0.153 -0.021 -0.106 -0.129 
 (-0.216) (0.001) (0.233) (-0.048) (-0.613) (-0.136) (-0.428) (-1.048) 
Llpnl -1.994  1.340 -2.773  1.866  0.132 -0.754  0.165  0.256 
 (-0.661) (0.861) (-0.549) (1.097) (0.139) (-0.285) (0.177) (0.193) 
Loang -0.022 -0.000 -0.029  0.001 -0.021 -0.003 -0.023  0.000 
 (-1.019) (-0.042) (-0.814) (0.167) (-2.051)** (-0.221) (-2.183)** (0.041) 
Profit  0.263  3.209 -0.775  3.183  4.872  2.589  4.785  2.047 
 (0.119) (1.714)* (-0.206) (1.508) (1.078) (1.263) (1.085) (0.978) 
Constant  38.466  26.264  40.903  28.435  10.967  77.764  10.881  66.029 
 (3.368)*** (1.654)* (2.567)** (1.587) (0.392) (3.834)*** (0.399) (5.008)*** 
         
         
Nb of Obs.: 856 856 856 856 857 856 857 856 
R-squared: 0.820 0.845 0.696 0.851 0.664 0.823 0.665 0.866 
         
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of the one year lagged 
value of the endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. To define our sub-samples of 
banks, we consider the median value of the considered ratio (trading revenue/ net operating income or off-balance sheet 
activities/ total assets) and delete the 10% of our sample observations with a value of the ratio around the median. Then, we 
distinguish banks with low values from banks with high values. Trading revenue/ net operating income is considered as high 
(low) if it is greater (lower) than 6.15% (4.30%). Off-balance sheet activities/ total assets is considered as high (low) if it is 
greater (lower) than 20.17% (16.15%).Standard errors are adjusted robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 
and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are between parentheses. Variables definition: Buffer = ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 
capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ Total assets ; Mktdisc_Junior = 
Subordinated debt/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior = Other market funding/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc = Total market 
funding/ total liabilities ; Logta = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Comp = Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the same 
country ; Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we 
regress the ratio (Net Income/ Total Equity) on the profit variable ; Llpnl = Loan loss provisions/ Net loans ; Loang = Annual 
net loan growth ; Profit = Post tax profit/ Total assets. 
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Table A9: Capital buffer, market discipline and bank activity differentiation 
considering a narrower definition of senior debt. 
Model 2: 
, 0 1 , 2 , , ,
1
          _ 2 _
J
i t i t i t j ji t i t i t
j
buffer C umktdisc senior mktdisc junior     

        
 
Eq Name: (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) 
Model: Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 
Sample: Whole sample 
(Trading revenue/ 
net operating  
income) high 
(Trading revenue/ 
net operating  
income) low 
(Off-balance sheet 
activities/ total 
assets) high 
(Off-balance sheet 
activities/ total 
assets) low 
      
      
Mktdisc_Senior2  0.064  0.082 -0.043  0.087 -0.004 
 (2.121)** (1.778)* (-0.343) (2.341)** (-0.041) 
Mktdisc_Junior  0.932  0.730  0.667  0.798  1.061 
 (3.680)*** (3.446)*** (0.841) (2.354)** (3.001)*** 
Nla -0.129 -0.091 -0.161 -0.067 -0.162 
 (-5.027)*** (-2.608)*** (-2.809)*** (-0.715) (-3.031)*** 
Size -2.661 -2.316 -2.997 -0.357 -3.454 
 (-5.321)*** (-4.059)*** (-1.159) (-0.153) (-1.863)* 
Comp  0.542  0.528  0.584  0.690  0.225 
 (4.052)*** (3.917)*** (3.202)*** (3.715)*** (1.022) 
Gdpg  0.027 -0.019 -0.040  0.041 -0.020 
 (0.615) (-0.322) (-0.101) (0.347) (-0.051) 
Roe  0.073  0.091  0.000 -0.053 -0.171 
 (1.217) (0.455) (0.003) (-0.135) (-0.488) 
Llpnl -1.427 -1.572  2.876  0.291  0.556 
 (-0.822) (-1.014) (0.573) (0.155) (0.148) 
Loang -0.018 -0.021  0.006 -0.025 -0.000 
 (-1.552) (-1.878)* (0.324) (-2.790)*** (-0.005) 
Profit  0.041  0.028  1.588  4.989  0.515 
 (0.036) (0.021) (0.508) (0.586) (0.318) 
Constant  48.636  42.128  51.390  2.670  64.101 
 (5.901)*** (4.676)*** (1.222) (0.054) (1.882)* 
      
      
Nb of Obs.: 1861 935 926 939 923 
R-squared: 0.780 0.817 0.800 0.638 0.846 
      
      
 
This table shows estimation results obtained using the TSLS method. Our set of instruments consists of the one year lagged value of the 
endogenous variables. The regression includes time and individual fixed effects. Trading revenue/ net operating income is considered as 
high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (6.10%). Off-balance sheet activities/ total assets is considered 
as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample (18.13%). Standard errors are adjusted robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. T-stats are between parentheses. Variables 
definition: Buffer = ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/ risk-weighted assets) - regulatory minimum requirements ; Nla = Net loans/ Total assets ; 
Mktdisc_Junior = Subordinated debt/ total liabilities ; Mktdisc_Senior2 = Total money market funding/ total liabilities; Mktdisc = Total 
market funding/ total liabilities ; Logta = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Comp = Annual mean of the buffer of banks in the same 
country ; Gdpg = Annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (deseasonalized) ; Roe = the residuals obtained when  we regress the 
ratio (Net Income/ Total Equity) on the profit variable ; Llpnl = Loan loss provisions/ Net loans; Loang = Annual net loan growth ; Profit = 
Post tax profit/ Total assets. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
